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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
I 
The appellate court freely reviews issues involving statutes oflimitation. 
Necro Minerals Co. v. Morris Knudsen Corp. 140 Idaho 144, 90 P.3rd 894 
Western Family v. Vanek, 144 Idaho 150, 158 P.3rd 313 
II 
A contract, when being reviewed as to it's meaning and effect, as well as 
applicable statutes, should be reviewed as to the whole instrument to discern the 
parties' intentions, rights and obligations. 
Farber v. Idaho State Ins. Fund, 147 Idaho 307,208 P. 3rd 289 
Henderson v. Henderson Investment 148 Idaho 638,225 P.3 rd 568 
III 
Where reasonable persons could easily reach a different conclusion than that 
of the trial court or draw different inferences from the evidence presented summary 
judgment is not appropriate The Court keeps in mind that conflicting evidentiary 
facts must be viewed in favor of the nonmoving party and uses the same standard as 
that which is required of the trial court. 
Bonner Life Insurance . Co. v. Mark Wallace Dixson Irrevocable Trust, 14 7 
Idaho 117, 206 P. 3d 481.. 
Boise Tower LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774,215 P.3rd 498 
Edmunds v. Kramer, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3rd 338 
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IV 
Summary judgment is not proper where the affidavits and record raise any 
question as to the credibility of a witness if that witness is material. 
J. R. Simplot Co. v. Rosen, 144 Idaho 611,167 P. 3rd 748 
V. 
A breech of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing occurs when either 
party violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the contract. 
Bushi v. Sage health Care PLLC, 146 Idaho 764,203 P.3rd 694 
VI 
Great liberality should be exercised in permitting amendments to pleadings 
in furtherance of justice between the parties and in construing pleadings the focus is 
on insuring that a just result is accomplished. 
Villa Highlands LLC v. Western Community Insurance Co., 148 Idaho 598, 
226 P.3rd 540 
Markstaller v. Markstaller, 326 P. 2nd 994 
VII 
An implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in all 
employment contracts and an action by one party that significantly impairs any 
benefit or right of the other party violates the covenant. 
Jensen v. Sidney Stevens Implement Co., 36 Idaho 348,210 P. 1003 
Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881,243 P.3 rd 1069 
VIII 
Whether the strictures of LR.C.P. 11(b)(3) are satisfied is a question of law 
over which the appellate court has free review. 
Reinweld v. Eveland, 119 Idaho 111,803 P.2nd 1017 
IX 
If the requirements of I.RC.P. 11(b)(3) are not strictly followed any judgment 
rendered thereafter is void and must be set aside as a matter of law rather than as a 
matter of discretion. 





















An attorney fee is not warranted every time a commercial transaction is 
connected to the case as the term "commercial transaction' does not include 
transactions for personal or household purposes and the test is whether the 
gravamen of the offense. 
Brower v. E.I. DuPont 17 Idaho 780, 792 P, 2nd 315 
Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, i27 Idaho624, 903 P. 3rd 1321 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I 
Are there disputed issues of fact in the record precluding the entry of 
summary judgment? 
II 
Did the District Judge err by his failure to consider the concealment of a 
breach of contract by defendants', including the respondent? 
III 
Does the concealment of an intentional breach of contract by a participant 
toll the statute of limitations until discovery by the injured party? 
IV 
Was the acquisition by H & M, Inc .. , in redemption of some selected shares of 
it's issued stock, a valid transaction? 
V 
Was there a continuing duty of disclosure by the respondent to appellant of 
the disassociation and complete retirement by Ed Prater from H & M, Inc. and in a 
personal performance contract does a statute of limitation arise at the initial breech 
or is the statute tolled until damage is incurred by virtue of the breech. 
VI 
Is there a repeated breach of contract on each separate occasion that 
additional damage is incurred by appellant by virtue ofrespondent's nondisclosure 
and the opportunity to acquire shares of stock coming from Ed Prater that 



















Is the stock purchase agreement a personal performance contract with 
mutual continuing obligations, as well as rights, that precludes the commencement 
of the statute of limitations until the date on which appellant is damaged? 
VIII 
Did the magistrate err in determining to award attorney fees to respondent? 
IX 
Did the District Judge err in not providing a hearing on appellant's request 
for reconsideration of his court order granting summary judgment? 
X 
Did the District Court err in failing to consider appellant's motion for an 
order granting leave to amend appellant's complaint? 
XI 
Did the District Judge abuse his discretion on matters that may be considered 
discretionary? 
XII 
Did the Notice of Withdrawal meet the clear and informative standard 
required by the procedural rules? 
XIII 
Did the District Judge abuse his discretion in his determination that it was 
appropriate to enter a "final order" without considering the effect upon other 
defendants and the appellant as a result of the delay created by the required appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1985 the defendants, other than the respondent Nelson, your appellant 
and one other individual formulated an Idaho corporation, H & M Distributing, Inc. 
as a vehicle with which to acquire a wholesale business in Twin Falls, Idaho. Mr. 
Prater was the local manager of a wholesale company when it came up for sale. The 
company was involved in the sale of beverages, cigarettes, candy, grocery items and 





















subscribed to the purchase of some of the shares to be issued and at the same time 
each corporate member executed a Stock Subscription and Cross Purchase 
Agreement. After purchase of the business Mr. Prater continued as general manager 
of the business. Subsequently the respondent became an employee of the company. 
Eventually he became the head of the beverage division. In April of 200 2 Ed Prater 
elected to reduce his job requirements and semi retired, resigning as general 
manager and maintaining responsibility on a part time basis only for the heading 
and ordering of products other than beverages. At that time the respondent, Ron 
Nelson, was promoted to the position of general manager and was issued twenty 
two shares of corporate stock. 
At some unknown time in 2005, now documented as in February of 2005, Ed 
Prater elected to fully retire and disassociate himself from the company. To whom 
and when notice of his withdrawal was given is not known. No notice of this event 
was given to appellant by the respondent general manager, by Mr. Prater or by any 
one of the other officers and directors. Two or three years after that event, on 
inquiry as to the health of Mr. Prater, your appellant learned of Mr. Prayer's 
retirement. Your appellant went to Twin Falls, Idaho to inspect corporate records 
and was advised that the same were in Pocatello, Idaho. Appellant then went to 
Pocatello to review the corporate records. The corporate records failed to have any 
notice or record of Mr. Prater's retirement. Mr. Prater was still listed as a stock-
holder of record. There was no notice of any corporate meeting involving Mr. Prater 
or Mr. Prater's corporate stock. There were no minute entries reflecting any 
purchase or sale of Mr. Prater's stock by the corporation. At some point thereafter, 
in conversation with Mr. Nelson, he stated that he "had purchased some of Ed 
Prater's stock" and that he would like to acquire appellant's stock as he desired to 
own the company. Your appellant then advised Mr. Nelson of appellant's desire to 
purchase some of Mr. Prater's stock if it all had not been sold. At the same time your 
appellant advised Mr. Nelson that should appellant choose to sell that he could not 
sell his shares of stock without offering it to each of the other stockholders as well. 
The respondent continued to inquire intermittently as to whether or not appellant 
was willing to sell his stock at the price he had paid for Ed Prater's stock. In early 
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2010, late January or early February this was repeated. At an unknown date 
thereafter appellant received a notice of a corporate meeting to be held in Pocatello, 
Idaho on March 5, 2010. On March 4, 2010 the respondent, Ron Nelson, called 
appellant again stating that he" ... would increase his offer to Two Thousand Two 
Hundred Dollars per share which is more than they are worth .... " if appellant would 
consider selling now. Appellant replied that he would attend the company meeting 
on the next day and that a response would be given after the conclusion of the 
meeting. On arrival in Pocatello appellant learned that the meeting had been 
canceled by Dave Powers. No meeting was held. Mr. Nelson quit his job effective on 
March 31, 2010. 
On May 6, 2010 appellant filed the complaint in this proceeding. After 
service of process on each of the defendants appellant learned that the defendants 
were asserting that a sale of stock was made by Ed Prater to the company. The 
respondent asserts that he agreed to purchase twenty shares of stock on February 2, 
2005 and that the respondent acquired such stock on May 2, 2005. Appellant never 
received a notice of sale or proposed offer of sale from Mr. Prater, from H & M 
Distributing, from the respondent or from any of the other defendants. The 
respondent did not give notice of his proposed sale of his stock as required by the 
stock agreement. 
H & M Distributing, Inc. is a Sub S corporation with a fiscal year ending on 
September 30th of each year. Notice of the corporate records and the annual fiscal 
effect as to each shareholder is received in December and the notice for the year end 
2009 was received by appellant at that time. Damages have occurred to appellant as 
of the end of each fiscal year either by the lack of an opportunity to share in a 
greater pro rata ratio of profits or losses as determined as of the close of each fiscal 
year. 
ARGUMENT 
This appeal is taken from the decision of the trial judge in the entering of 
summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants, Ron Nelson, denying the 
plaintiff, affiant herein, the right to proceed on a claim arising out of actions or lack 
of actions of the defendants both individually and jointly. The focus of the case 
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involves the Stock Purchase Agreement and the actions or lack of actions of the 
respondent, Ron Nels on, and the granting of a summary judgment in favor of the 
respondent at a time after the Order permitting the withdrawal of appellant's 
counsel and prior to the time set for an appearance by plaintiff or a successor 
attorney. 
Each member of the appellate Court is now sitting and considering the issues 
as if he or she were sitting as the trial judge. It continues to be the burden of the 
moving party, the respondent, to justify and establish that there were no issues of 
fact precluding summary judgment. Additionally the trial judge is not permitted to 
weigh the evidence and any questions must be ruled in favor of the nonmoving 
party. Referring to appellant's second affidavit appellant would direct this Courts' 
attention to the factual statement that in two or three years after May 5, 2005 the 
company record still showed that Ed Prater was a stockholder ofrecord. As set 
forth in appellant's affidavit Mr. Nelson had stated to appellant that he had 
purchased twenty shares of Ed Prater's stock that almost doubled his claim of 
profits to appellant's detriment. The statement regarding Prater stock is not refuted 
or explained. Mr. Nelson is a material witness and his conflicting statement is not 
sufficient to support summary judgment. 
Another conflict arises from the record that precludes summary judgment is 
the stock purchase agreement that Mr. Nelson signed as well as what he knew and 
learned as general manager of the company. It can be reasonably implied that Mr. 
Prater's decision to fully retire was conveyed to Mr.Nelson. He also would know 
that the corporate records did not reflect any sale of stock to him and that as a 
stockholder Mr. Prater was required to give notice of his intention to sell to each 
other stockholder and that such had not been accomplished. If in fact Mr. Prater 
sold his stock to the company the same would be a void transaction as the same had 
not been authorized by the board of directors. No notice of intended redemption of 
stock, special or general had ever been issued. Again facts precluding summary 
judgment exist of record. 
With respect to the asserted statute of limitations the trial judge appears to 
have determined that a five year statute applied without setting forth the specific 
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statute relied upon. It is appellant's recollection that one time Idaho law provided 
that the failure to specifically plead the statute relied upon as a defense precluded 
the claim and constituted a waiver. Regardless the fabricated date of February 2, 
2005 did not exist of record in 2007 or 2008 when appellant reviewed corporate 
records. Regardless the statute of limitations could not begin as knowledge of the 
void sale to the company had been concealed from appellant and as such any statute 
of limitations would be tolled until such time as appellant learned of the breach. 
The trial judge erred in failing to consider the effect of concealment upon a start 
date for a statute of limitations. Another basis for tolling was also not considered by 
the trial judge in that no damage to appellant had occurred as of February 2, 2005. 
The first date on which appellant suffered damage was on September 30, 2005. 
That was the closing of the fiscal year for the Sub S corporation at which time each 
stockholders' distributional interest is determined by the number of shares held on 
that date. At that time Mr. Nelson received almost twice the percentage that he had 
received on September 30, 2004 and appellant suffered a proportional reduction in 
has pro rata share. Appellant also contends that the obligation of disclosure of 
purchase by the respondent was a continuing duty of the general manager. The 
failure to disclose and provide an opportunity to acquire unsold stock or a portion 
of each purchaser's if none is available was a breach of Mr. Nelson's covenant of 
good faith that he owed to appellant Mr. Nelson was well aware that notice of Mr. 
Prater's sale should have been provided to appellant and he could have reduced 
plaintiffs damages by disclosure instead of joining the others in concealment of the 
breach. On September 30, 2006 appellant again incurred damages as a result of an 
unknown breach and a similar damage was incurred on September 30th of each year 
thereafter. Appellant contends that the dismissal of all claims by the trial judge was 
error as the claim for 2010 did not arise until after the filing of appellant' complaint 
and the same applies to the 2011 claim that just was incurred a couple of months 
ago. 
For some unknown reason appellant's copy of the trial court's record does 
not contain a copy of the trial court's Order allowing Mr. Gadd to withdraw as 


















need for appellant to be present at the hearing on the motion to avoid being 
prejudiced by his total lack of conception of appellant's claims. The order advised 
appellant to appear in person or by counselor there could be consequences and 
appellant complied with that Order. Whether the notice and order meet with the 
requirement of I.R.C.P, Rule 11 or not cannot be determined from the record. In any 
event it is appellant's contention that it was error and an abuse of discretion to 
refuse to set aside his summary judgment decision. Appellant also contends it was 
error to refuse to enter an order for leave to amend as none such exists in the record 
although contended by both counsel for the respondent and the trial judge that it 
had been entered. Good cause existed for such leave to be obtained as new 
information was obtained subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the 
failure of the respondent to comply with the stock agreement in respect to both his 
initial stock and the Prater stock he acquired. He failed to give a sixty notice to the 
stockholders as individuals that is a very material personal requirement of each 
corporate member. 
As a final point it is appellant's contention that it was error of the trial court 
to enter a judgment for attorney fees against appellant. The requirement of a sixty 
day personal notice gives each party an opportunity to explore and determine what 
range of value might be involved with respect to the stock. His affidavit reflects hat 
he made an agreement for sale without any notice that is the gravamen of the 
offense for which damages are sought If the Court determines that the summary 
judgment cannot stand then the attorney fee issue will be resolved without 
consideration as to the nature of the breech. In any event the decision of the 
magistrate should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant recalls having seen an Idaho case in which the appellate court 
determined that the issuance of a Rule 54 (b) order was inappropriate and as 
recalled the Court set that order aside and remanded the matter to the trial court for 
further proceedings. Appellant could not locate authority for this but does believe 





















In summary it can be simply stated that appellant believes the facts and the 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT A COPY OF THE FOREGOING APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
WAS SERVED ON THE RESPONDENTS BY MAILING TWO COPIES OF THE SAME, 
postage prepaid, TO BROOKE BALDWIN REDMOND, P.O. BOX 226, TWIN FALLS, 
IDAHO, 83303 THIS 14th DAY OF DECEMBER, 2011. 
l ;·· 77 / 7 
JOHN B. Kt:;{~, k), t~7/fA/IIJ ,,_ 
t,,/ 
11 
